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Abstract
The 11 original regions for organ allocation in the United States were determined by proximity between hospitals
that provided deceased donors and transplant programs. As liver transplants became more successful and demand
rose, livers became a scarce resource. A national system has been implemented to prioritize liver allocation according to
disease severity, but the system still operates within the original procurement regions, some of which have significantly
more deceased donor livers. Although each region prioritizes its sickest patients to be liver transplant recipients, the
sickest in less liver-scarce regions get transplants much sooner and are at far lower risk of death than the sickest in more
liver-scarce regions. This has resulted in drastic and inequitable regional variation in preventable liver disease related
death rate.
A new region districting proposal – an eight district model – has been carefully designed to reduce geographic inequities,
but is being fought by many transplant centers that face less scarcity under the current model. The arguments put forth
against the new proposal, couched in terms of fairness and safety, will be examined to show that the new system is
technologically feasible, will save more lives, and will not worsen socioeconomic disparity. While the new model is likely
not perfect, it is a necessary step toward fair allocation.
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Background
As liver transplant was developed in the 1960’s and 70’s,
the challenge of organ preservation necessitated that
donor livers be located near those in need of a trans-
plant. Groups of local hospitals knew to contact the
nearest transplant program when they had a potential
liver donor, which set the stage for the locations and
reach of present-day organ procurement organizations
(OPOs), which are responsible for identifying potential
donors, procuring organs from them, and ensuring these
organs are delivered efficiently to appropriate recipients
[1]. Within these geographically-defined regions, alloca-
tion fairness became an increasing concern as both
growing demand and the success of liver transplantation
caused the demand to outpace supply. Today fairness is
still a concern due to a failure to develop an allocation
policy for scarce livers that treats them as a national
resource.
A nationally agreed upon system was created and
refined to prioritize allocation decisions according to
disease severity. But today, liver matching remains con-
strained by the original 11 OPO boundaries. Because
some of these regions have greater numbers of deceased
donor livers, the system is now creating drastic and
inequitable regional variation in preventable liver disease
related death rate.
This disparity in access to liver transplants led the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), an
agency of the United Stated Federal Government, to call
for greater geographic liver distribution and reduced
inter-transplant program variability. A new region
districting proposal – an eight district model – has been
carefully designed to reduce geographic inequities, but is
being fought by many transplant centers that face less
scarcity under the current model. The arguments put
forth against the new proposal, couched in terms of fair-
ness and safety, will be examined to show that the new
system is technologically feasible, will save more lives,
and will not worsen socioeconomic disparity. While the
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new model is likely not perfect, it is a necessary step
toward fair allocation.
Main text
The current strategy for distribution and a proposal for
an eight district model
Although the existing division of 11 organ sharing
regions and 58 donation service areas in the United
States are subject to the same recipient priority ranking
system – Model for End-stage Liver Disease (MELD)
score, which is a validated calculation using objective
variables (international normalized ratio, serum creatin-
ine, and serum bilirubin) to predict survival of patients
with liver disease [2] – a given patient’s rank currently
matters most within the patient’s regional boundaries.
Each patient on the waiting list can only receive a liver
procured within the region or a liver that other regions
do not want. A regional system is necessary because
livers have a limited period during which they can be
transported, cold ischemic time. A liver obtained in
Tampa will never be helpful to a patient in Honolulu,
but the existing boundaries reflect more than just limits
on liver viability. They are the product of historic rela-
tionships between transplant centers and healthcare
organizations that come into contact with potential
donors [3]. This map was not designed to optimize allo-
cation to patients in greatest need. Because more livers
are available in some regions, these regions are able to
transplant patients who are less sick, thus leading to
fewer deaths in those regions. The difference in
estimated risk of three-month mortality without trans-
plant is as high as 60% across regions [3]. Since livers
and other organs are donated with the goal of saving
American lives and since government policy has long
recognized the duty to steward donated cadaver organs
as a national resource [4], this risk variation is unjust.
In the late 1990s, DHHS directed the Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network (OPTN) to revise al-
location to reflect three objectives, but only the first has
received significant attention. The Final Rule states: (1)
Set priority rankings…through objective and measurable
medical criteria; (2) Distribute organs over as broad a
geographic area as feasible; and (3) reduce inter-
transplant program variability [5]. In 2002, the MELD
score was developed in response to the first objective,
allowing physicians to rank patients according to their
lab values. Since 2005, patients with a MELD of at least
15 would be listed with priority given to patients with
higher MELDs up to the highest numeric score of 40,
and then greatest priority given to patients ranked 1A or
1B (above 40). Efforts have been made to broaden shar-
ing within each region. However, more than a decade
has elapsed with no attention to the requirement to
broaden geographic distribution. Some regions are
transplanting patients with a median MELD of 23 (in-
cluding states like Kentucky and Tennessee) and others
are transplanting patients with a median MELD higher
than 30 (including states like New York and California)
[6]. The drastically higher risk of liver-related death for
patients in the latter regions has prompted the United
Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) to consider a new
proposal designed to distribute livers over as broad a
geographic area as feasible and to reduce inter-transplant
program variability.
The plan put forth by the UNOS Liver and Intestine
Transplant Committee considers the need for better
sharing, oversight to prevent abuse, promoting aware-
ness and monitoring impact. To compare the current
allocation model to proposed districting changes, the
Committee employed linear programming algorithms in
the Liver Simulated Allocation Model (LSAM), which is
a validated discrete events simulator that estimates
outcomes of each system [7]. According to the Committee
report, the LSAM uses “historical inputs,” such as “donors
and candidates, organ offer acceptance practices, [and
waitlist] removals for death or other reasons,” as well as a
transport model based on distances between donor
hospitals and transplant centers, and between centers and
airports, to calculate and compare outcomes between the
current regions and proposed changes. The LSAM’s
outputs included median MELD at transplant, number
and rate of waitlist deaths, total deaths, and percentage of
transplants by various demographics [7].
In collaboration with the Scientific Registry of
Transplant Recipients – a federal contractor responsible
for providing analytic support to the OPTN – the
Committee analyzed the modeling data and considered
different modifications including a four district model,
eight district model, and a concentric circles model [8].
With the intention of transitioning from local sharing
toward national sharing, the Committee has chosen new
districts sensitive to the limits of liver transport time
and associated costs that would minimize MELD score
disparity across regions. The eight district model
performed as well as the four district model while being
more cost and time effective, and the concentric circles
model was less effective than either of the former [8].
Accordingly, the 11 districts would be transformed into
8, with 150 mile proximity circles to attach areas of
higher supply to areas of higher need [3]. The new
model would also ensure that a difference of one or two
MELD points between a local patient and a distant
patient do not result in the costly transport of a liver by
granting the local patient additional points for proximity.
The eight district model should reduce geographic
disparity of MELD at transplant so that no single
population bears greater risk, whereas currently, popula-
tions bear different risk based on where they live.
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Because there is some evidence of MELD inflation
through the application of “exception points” in current
liver-scarce regions [9], the new plan proposes revisions
to exception point criteria to most accurately reflect
disease severity. It calls for the establishment of a
National Liver Review Board to ensure uniform applica-
tion of exception points [3]. Furthermore, the proposal
requires education and awareness campaigns to ensure
understanding of the new system prior to implementa-
tion, as well as standardized data recording and analysis
to ensure reduction in median MELD disparity and to
identify any unintended consequences [3].
The primary impetus for the new proposal is to make
liver allocation more fair. Does it succeed? What are the
relevant requirements of fairness?
To be fair any allocation system must treat accord-
ing to medical need without attention to other indi-
vidual characteristics. The worth of a life is not
determined by race, gender, socioeconomic status,
ability, or location, and thus these demographics
should neither be weighed in allocation nor unduly
affected by allocation. Under the current system, loca-
tion is a strong indicator of whether a person in need
of a liver will survive. If the implementation of a new
model results in a significant mortality gap between
men and women, or between people of different racial
identification, or between the wealthy and the poor,
then it must be adjusted. Careful attention has been
paid by the eight district model’s designers to ensure
that geography will not result in such disparities.
Furthermore, the scarcity of a life-saving national re-
source carries the duty of careful stewardship to ensure
the resource is used to provide the greatest benefit. Be-
cause there are not enough livers for all persons in need,
those who are at greatest risk without a transplant must
be given priority. Cold ischemic time makes it necessary
to delineate regions in which patients are prioritized
against each other according to risk. But there are far
more livers in some regions than others. Thus the
sickest patients in some regions are much less sick at
the time of transplant than are the sickest in others. This
means organs are not being allocated to those in greatest
need and more people are dying. Geography is not, in
itself, a morally relevant variable. Allocation ought to
occur according to medical need and without signifi-
cant benefit disparity among demographic and geo-
graphic groups. Reconfiguring organ allocation
regions appears to be an effective means for reducing
geographic disparity.
Vocal opponents of the new proposal are affiliated
with transplant programs in regions with less liver
scarcity. There are a few themes that reoccur in their ar-
guments against change: Outcomes would be worse;
costs would rise; the MELD data catalyzing the proposal
is inaccurate; and the new system would be less fair. The
reality of disparity in access indicates that these argu-
ments are likely founded on different motives. It is
possible that these motives are the desire to protect the
strong financial position afforded to transplant programs
in areas with lower liver scarcity, and the more admir-
able desire to protect one’s own patients who would be
forced to wait longer for a liver under the new proposal.
With over 17,000 people in need of, approved and
waiting for a liver [10], scarcity is a serious problem
which necessitates protecting the interests of all Americans
over the understandable loyalty physicians feel to
their own patients.
Liver transplant outcomes will improve
Those who claim that the new districts would make out-
comes worse point to greater liver travel time and lower
survival benefit of transplanting sicker patients [11].
Both points must be considered in context. The pro-
posed eight district model is drawn to respect the limits
of liver travel time. Under the new proposal, the number
of livers flying would rise but only from 55% to 65%, and
they would only travel approximately fifteen more
minutes on average. Under the new model, approxi-
mately 95% of transplants are projected to occur within
the reconfigured districts, with a median transport time
of 1.8 h [3]. The generally accepted cold ischemic time
for a liver is six to ten h [12], and at least one recent
study of 350 liver transplants shows that even cold
ischemic time upwards of 12 h did not affect graft or
patient survival [13].
The focus on lower survival benefit of sicker trans-
plant patients is equally misguided. It is true that the
new districts would raise the median MELD at trans-
plant to between 24 and 29.1 [3], thus cutting regional
variance in half, but the survival data for patients at this
MELD is not worse than for patients transplanted at the
median MELD of regions with the least sick liver trans-
plant patients. In fact, a retrospective analysis of 37
studies including over 53,000 patients concluded that
there is a low level of evidence that relative MELD score
predicts post-transplant survival [14]. The MELD score
was designed to predict risk of death without transplant,
and studies have validated that higher MELD indicates a
higher waiting list mortality risk [15, 16]. This actually
supports the importance of eliminating median trans-
plant MELD regional disparity. Outcome metrics
modeled under the eight district model indicate there
would be a decrease in the number of overall deaths, in-
cluding pretransplant, waiting list, and post-transplant,
and predict no significant survival differences according
to other demographics such as age, sex, or race [3].
Implementing the new proposal will improve, not
worsen, liver transplant outcomes.
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Costs will drop
Some costs would likely rise under the new proposal,
specifically transportation, and particularly for transplant
programs in areas with lower median MELD scores [17].
But this cost is offset by savings in transplant-associated
care, and by the value of saving additional lives.
Compared with the current allocation system, over five
years the eight district model is estimated to increase
per-patient transportation costs predominantly due to
longer travel time. However, it is also estimated to
decrease Medicare spending for waitlisted patients (less
time treating encephalopathy, variceal bleeding, infec-
tions, and hepatocellular carcinoma), and total cost of
actual transplants and post-transplant care because of
fewer total transplants [18]. Overall five year costs are
expected to drop about 1.3% [18]. Medicare – which
pays for the vast majority of liver transplant related costs
– will be saving money overall, thus taxpayers and
Medicare enrollees (including liver transplant patients)
can expect that their costs will not rise. Because trans-
portation costs are assigned to a Medicare cost center
[18], transplant center reimbursement rates might be
adjusted to reflect increased transportation costs without
reducing the availability of Medicare resources.
Costs should, of course, be tracked carefully after
implementing any new system. But based on current
estimates, redistricting to achieve a more ethical alloca-
tion system should not impact patients’ financial access
to transplants or the capacity for transplant centers that
bear additional costs to provide them. If evidence begins
to suggest this possibility, then methods for increasing
reimbursement rates or creating federal subsidization
should be explored.
Livers are not local
Opponents also say that livers should “stay local” to
prevent widening the socioeconomic healthcare gap, and
to honor donor intentions [19]. The new eight district
model should have no impact on access to healthcare
and would better honor expressed donor wishes. It is
true that the regions with lowest median MELD at trans-
plant are proximate to populations of low socioeco-
nomic status, and several within those populations likely
benefit from their transplant programs. However,
programs with higher median MELD at transplant are,
despite in some cases being near some of the wealthiest
cities in the nation, also proximate to disadvantaged
populations in the reconfigured regions. All people in
need of liver transplant with access to health care in
each region will continue to be prioritized according to
their MELD scores. The extent to which the wait-listing
process screens people based on ability to pay is a prob-
lem regardless of location. There is no data suggesting
that discrimination based on financial status is greater in
more liver-scarce regions. Furthermore, individuals with-
out access to healthcare, particularly in rural areas, are
sometimes not being waitlisted for organs regardless of
their region, and while efforts should be made to include
these individuals, adopting the eight district model
would not affect this population.
Those who claim livers should stay local incorrectly
assume livers are already kept local. 47–62.5% of trans-
plant recipients from the five busiest transplant
programs in the nation (all among the lowest median
MELD at transplant) are not from the program’s
community [20]. Patients with adequate financial re-
sources can and do migrate to areas of lower MELD at
transplant and often list at multiple centers, which
increases the chances of being prioritized [21]. This is
not an option for people without the resources to re-
locate, especially under conditions of poor health. The
incentive to relocate would disappear if median MELD
at transplant was consistent across regions, thus making
allocation more fair across socioeconomic lines.
It might make intuitive sense that potential donors
would want their organs to be received by sick members
of their own communities, but as just described, the
current system does not match this intuition. Donated
livers are often not transplanted into local recipients be-
cause wealthy recipients relocate to regions with better
donor to recipient ratios. Systems like the VA utilize
centers of excellence as do some payers, overriding lo-
cality. Additionally, a recent survey shows that 82% of
respondents would prefer their organs go to the person
in greatest medical need regardless of location [22].
Organ allocation policy should not be determined by
public preference, but this data indicates that the eight
district model would support the autonomous prefer-
ences of a significant portion of potential donors.
Although livers cannot yet be a truly national resource
due to technological constraints of transport time, end-
stage liver disease affects the entire population. The
eight district model provides more effective treatment
nationally than the existing skewed geographic system.
More donors will not fix allocation
There is regional disparity in the number of registered
donors that in some cases corresponds with areas of
liver scarcity, but focusing on increasing donor numbers
will not fix allocation disparity. New York State has the
lowest number of registered donors among the United
States [23], and also suffers from one of the highest
median MELD scores at liver transplant. Opponents of
the new proposal claim that liver scarcity in areas like
New York is the consequence of low registered donor
numbers, and that it would be unfair to take livers from
areas with better registration. Two facts undermine this
claim. First, it is an unfortunate truth that many areas
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with higher procurement rates also have more deaths
caused by guns, car accidents, and strokes [24], which
are circumstances that provide for donation after brain
death. Areas like New York that have better public
health infrastructure have less incidents that lend them-
selves to deceased liver donation, regardless of the
number of registered donors. Although beyond the
scope of this paper, it would be best if the geographic
disparity in liver availability were reduced by implemen-
tation of additional public health measures thus leading
to fewer deaths overall. When this occurs, we will still
be morally obligated to ensure that liver distribution
prioritizes those in greatest need.
Second, even if OPOs got every eligible person to
donate, there would only be an additional 1,300 livers
available over a six year period [25], which hardly makes
a dent in the context of over 17,000 people on the wait-
ing list [10]. However, there is no question that efforts
must be made to increase donation rates, because those
1,300 additional livers nationally might save 1,300
additional lives over six years.
There is a valid argument based on reciprocity that a
community desiring access to organs for transplant
should demonstrate commitment to donation. But the
problem with using the reciprocity argument to restrict
a state’s access to transplant on the basis of low
registered donor percentage is that a low registration
rate is likely not perfectly correlated to the number of
willing donors. There is some evidence to suggest that
there are more people willing to be donors than there
are registered donors, for reasons including not knowing
how to register, or not thinking of oneself as healthy
enough to donate [26, 27]. This suggests there are other
reasons for low state donor registration, which might in-
clude ineffective education campaigns and/or provision
of inadequate registration opportunities. In light of this,
it is not fair to punish sick New York residents – almost
4 million of whom are registered donors [23], and
potentially more who might be willing to donate but do
not have the necessary education or opportunity to
register – for their state’s inability to convert willing
individuals into registered donors.
The median MELD and exception points
There is evidence to suggest that patients are receiving
inflated MELD scores through the assignment of “excep-
tion points,” which are supposed to be awarded in cases
when MELD factors are not sufficient to represent the
patient’s risk of pretransplant mortality [9]. But there is
no evidence to suggest that the practice is isolated to
regions of greater liver-scarcity. The most prominent
example is additional points awarded to patients with
Hepatocellular Carcinoma (HCC), which is the most
common form of liver cancer. The logic goes that
because conditions like HCC are not associated with
worsening liver function but do indicate higher risk of
death without transplant, affected patients should re-
ceive exception points to better compete with other
patients who have more obviously failing livers [28].
Despite intentions to improve fairness, the result has
been a steady increase in median MELD across regions
and comparatively superior outcomes for patients with
HCC-related exceptions across regions. Contrary to the
claims that this practice is more common in more
liver-scarce regions [11], a study of close to 79,000 liver
transplant patients between 2005 and 2012 shows that
regions with the least scarcity have the greatest percent-
ages of waitlisted patients with exception points [28].
Furthermore, vastly greater numbers of waitlisted
patients in the most liver-scarce regions die each year.
So while the practice of awarding exception points might
need to be reexamined, current practice is not unfairly
benefiting patients in any specific regions. The new
proposal would create a National Liver Review Board to
ensure consistency in the exception point award process
across regions. The UNOS Liver and Intestine Committee
has submitted new exception point guidance that the
National Liver Review Board would use to assess excep-
tion requests [3]. Independent of the primary impetus to
reconfigure districts, the establishment of a national Board
is an important move toward justice.
Conclusion
Examining what different stakeholders have to gain or
lose by the implementation of the eight district model
reveals the understandable (but easily overcome) motiva-
tions behind the opposition. Some larger centers will see
less revenue. Some smaller centers serving more remote
populations might not be able to maintain their trans-
plant programs [5]. Logistical complexity will increase
because more organs (and potentially surgical teams)
would require transportation for longer distances. OPOs
will need to re-coordinate their operations. The hurdles,
however, are but minor necessities in light of the ex-
pected benefits. Existing regions of comparatively low
donor to recipient ratios will have access to more livers
for their comparatively sicker prioritized patients.
Nationally, the redistricting proposal will significantly
reduce the variation in median MELD at transplant,
reduce the prevalence of the sickest candidates thus
reducing suffering, and is expected to save over 300 lives
per year [5].
Transplant programs in less liver-scarce regions do
not want to incur the additional expense, loss of
revenue, and complications that the eight district model
would entail. It is possible that reimbursement rates
could be altered to capture the revenue loss as livers are
moved to areas of greater need. But what price are we
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not willing to pay, and what revenue should we not be
willing to sacrifice, to reduce suffering and save
hundreds of lives? We might not be able to expect indi-
vidual physicians to adopt a public health or national
stewardship mindset; we probably do not want them to
do so as good advocates for their patients. However,
justice requires that under conditions of a widespread
need, and severely limited resources involving a national
resource, the preferences of individuals with lower
MELD scores to be transplanted sooner cannot super-
sede the obligation to save more total lives. It is the duty
of government, in this case the OPTN, to capitalize on
the technical capacity to improve liver allocation fairness
at a national level, and to monitor the impact of change.
The new eight district model might not be the best
allocation system, but it is a step toward fairness.
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